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1. Tindale’s audience
Without audiences there would be no rhetorical argumentation. Without audiences there would
be no rhetoric. Without audiences there would be no argumentation. The importance of
audiences for rhetoric and argumentation cannot be overstated. Thus, considering the constitutive
necessity of audiences in our fields, it is strange, if not down right worrying, that we spend so
few pages on researching audiences. Fortunately, Professor Christopher Tindale has addressed
this lacuna in many publications, and now he has done it in a book length work on the
Philosophy of Argumentation and Audience Reception (Tindale 2015) The thrust of the argument
in his book is that “[t]heories of argumentation must not only have an appreciation for the
importance of audience and a role for the concept, they must develop around it” (Tindale 2015,
p. 19).
Choosing between the logical, dialectical and rhetorical strands of argumentation, Tindale
considers the rhetorical strand as the one with the most promise for insightful discussion of “the
role that audiences play in the construction and evaluation of argumentation” (p. 18).
Placing audience in the centre of a theory of argumentation, Tindale suggests, draws
attention to three difficult issues (p. 24 ff.): The first is the identity of the audience: who “is the
audience of any particular argumentative discourse”, and how can an arguer “accommodate a
composite audience comprised of different groups and individuals” (p. 25)? The second issue is
persuasion, because if audiences really are so composite and complex “how are they persuaded
at all?” (p. 28). The question of persuasion also relates to the third issue: what is a good
argument? This concerns evaluation of argumentation: “what makes an argument, good, strong,
or cogent”; what are the criteria we should use to evaluate, and how are they recognized (p. 31)?
These three issues, evaluation, persuasion, and identity, pose complex and difficult
questions. Professor Tindale is right in claiming that the answers to questions about these
matters, heavily “depends on the context of argumentation and what expectations are alive in that
context” (p. 32, here talking about evaluation).
In general, Tindale’s audience perspective moves us towards a social understanding of
argumentation. This is one of the greatest benefits of his study. This move towards the social is
especially evident in the treatment of Aristotle, Perelman, and Habermas. The rhetorical
audience of Aristotle, for instance, is described as an active participant in the process of
persuasion, rather than a passive recipient of persuasive argument.
Audiences contribute the details of arguments, because the speaker necessarily must take
the audience into consideration, and because audiences must complete the enthymematic parts of
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the rhetoric (p. 56). Perelman takes us further than Aristotle, Tindale suggests, and “we begin to
see that it is important to ask how audiences experience argumentation” (p. 78). This also takes
us further “into the important question of how audience-considerations operate in the evaluation
of argumentation” (p. 78). Perelman’s identification of the three audiences and the way the
universal audience is anticipated in the structure of the singular and the specific audience also
supports the “idea of an active, engaged audience” (p. 78).
It may seem surprising that Tindale chooses to study Habermas in his exploration of
rhetorical audiences. However, also the Habermasian perspective is used for its invitational and
active view of audiences. Mostly, however, the benefit of this perspective lies in the notion of the
“ideal” audience, helping us to understand that pure persuasive effectiveness is not enough. As
Tindale points out:
better arguments are judged against community standards of rationality
themselves instantiated in an audience that necessarily has an aspect of the “ideal”
about it while remaining concrete in the relevant social context. (p. 98)
The following chapters, explores issues concerning the nature of social argumentation; especially
meaning, testimony, emotion, as well as identity and agency. These chapters move Tindale’s
argument forward: with Paul Grice (e.g. Grice 1989) he explores how speaker’s intentions
convey meaning, with the relevance theorists (e.g. Wilson & Sperber 2012) he explores how
audiences interpret meaning, and with Robert Brandom (Brandom 1994, 2008) he explores how
arguments function as meaning in use, underscoring that meaning takes place between speaker
and audience (arising from networks of commitment).
Tindale’s book paints a convincing picture of a general – perhaps “universal” or “ideal” –
audience. We get insight into how such a general audience reasons, how it makes meaning, how
it reacts emotionally, and so on. However, I must confess that I think the audience-perspective is
sometimes put too much in the background. A book that explicitly claims to be about audience
reception seems to promise an examination of how audiences actually engage with arguments:
how they react to them, negotiate them and encompass them into their cognitive environment.
2. The speculative tradition of audience studies in rhetoric and argumentation
Nonetheless, the book does take an audience-perspective, which is important since
argumentation research very rarely takes on the perspective of the audience. In that sense it is an
important contribution to a tradition of rhetorical investigation of audiences that goes back the
second part of the 20th century, Perelman being the most prominent example. Like Tindale’s
book, these studies improve our understanding of rhetoric, argumentation, and audience; even
though they refrain from involving empirical studies and generally constrict themselves to
philosophical and theoretical constructions of audiences.
Take the audience in The New Rhetoric, for instance, which is generally viewed as “a
construction of the speaker” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, p. 19). After Perelman’s
audiences, the second most discussed audience in rhetoric is probably the one described by
Lloyd F. Bitzer in his theory of the rhetorical situation. Bitzer makes it clear that rhetorical
communication, per definition, is communication addressed to an audience. A rhetorical
audience consists of “those persons who are capable of being influenced by discourse and of
being mediators of change” (Bitzer 1968, p. 7 f.). In this way Bitzer describes how certain

2

JENS E. KJELDSEN
situations and rhetorical responses transforms individuals into a historically concrete audience.
However, even though he describes the audience as a “material objective existence”, Bitzer’s
audience is still a theoretical construction
In 1970 Edwin Black introduced his notion of The Second Persona. His aim was to
overcome difficulties in making moral judgments of rhetorical discourse. He noted that
“discourses contain tokens of their authors” (Black 2013, p 596). Every text has an implied
author, which is not the real person of the author, but the rhetorical presence of the author in the
text. Black calls this the first person. However, texts and discourses also have a second persona
implied, “and that persona is its implied auditor”. An implied auditor “does not focus on a
relationship between a discourse and an actual auditor. It focuses instead on the discourse alone,
and extracts from it the audience it implies” (Black 2013, p. 597). Black calls this implied
audience “the second persona”. This second persona can be judged, because “[t]he critic can see
in the auditor implied by a discourse a model of what the rhetor would have his real auditor
become” (Black 2013, p. 598).
Philip Wander later described what he called “The third persona”, which is “the concept
of audience in rhetorical theory to include audiences not present, audiences rejected or negated
through the speech and/or the speaking situation” (Wander 2013, p. 614).
A similar ideological approach characterizes Maurice Charland’s treatment of what he
terms the constitutive audience. Charland sets out to “show the degree to which collective
identities forming the basis of rhetorical appeals themselves depend upon rhetoric” (Charland
1987, p. 437). In line with Althusser’s theory of hailing Charland explains how rhetorical
structures and appeals not only persuade people, but also to create, constitute, people. In an
analysis of the rhetoric of the independence movement of Quebec, the French-speaking province
of Canada, Charland demonstrates how the rhetoric of a white paper calls the Quebecois into
being, thereby constituting them as an audience and a people.
These are some of the most cited and acknowledged accounts of audiences in rhetorical
research. They all have one thing in common, a trait that Professor Tindale’s perspective share:
they are speculative, theoretical constructions of the audience. Audiences are either perceptions
of the speaker, implied by the text, left out by the text, constituted by the rhetoric or imagined by
the researcher. None of these studies deal with actual audiences or take into consideration any
kind of real reception or factual response given by an existing audience. The situation today does
not appear very different: empirical, qualitative audience studies are almost non-existent in
research into rhetoric and argumentation.
3. Identity, persuasion, evaluation
Nonetheless, The Philosophy of Argument and Audience Reception provides important insight
into how we can understand and describe rhetorical audiences, and into what we ought to
consider when studying arguments and audiences empirically. Even though Tindale does not
engage in actual reception studies, he does mentions theorists of reception such as Hans Robert
Jauss (1982) and Wolfgang Iser (1978), and supports an understanding of audiences as active
and engaged. Furthermore, Tindale makes a good argument for applying the notion of “cognitive
environment” (taken from Relevance theory, see Wilson & Sperber 2012) in order to move our
understanding of the audience outside the speaker’s mind. Rhetoric and argumentation is
necessarily a meeting of minds, which means that mutual meaning is a prerequisite. As I have
described above, much audience theory in rhetoric and argumentation approach this issue by
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speculating on how a speaker imagines an audience. By applying the concept of “the cognitive
environment”, I suggest, Tindale moves closer to a less speculative and more material – or
objective – understanding of such mutual knowledge. A cognitive environment, he explains, is
the set of facts that are manifest to a person, and an assumption (which could be true or false) is
manifest if a cognitive environment provides sufficient evidence for its adoption” (p. 145). A fact
is manifest to someone at some time, “if that person is capable of representing it mentally as true
or probably true” (p. 144). Put in more vernacular terms: a cognitive environment is what an
individual is able to see, recognize, know, and represent. Tindale seeks an understanding of
cognitive environment that is wider than the one described by Sperber and Wilson. In Tindale’s
audience theory, cognitive environments are “both cognitive and emotional; they involve both
facts and values”, they are “modifiable spaces” open to change. They are the spaces that
condition “the reception of argumentation” (p. 222). Such spaces can overlap, since we may see
recognize and know the same as other people, which is why rhetoric and argumentation is
possible: we have shared cognitive environments (cf. p. 145).
The book contributes in several ways to audience studies in rhetoric and argumentation.
Firstly, Tindale’s work contributes to a shift toward a social understanding of argument and
audience reception. Audiences are of essential importance for the simple reason that rhetoric and
argumentation would not exist without them. So, both the turn towards social and contextual
understanding of argument and placing audience as a central element is a necessary move for the
study of argumentation. Secondly, the questions of 1) audience identity, 2) persuasion and 3)
evaluation are not only philosophical problems, but also issues that can be investigated
empirically.
Take audience identity: As Tindale points out: aspirations to examine audiences are
sometimes countered with the argument that such studies are futile, because we cannot really
know who the audience is. Actually, we may add, it is not only difficult to determine the precise
audience, it is generally impossible. Even when an audience is only one person – or oneself – it
is challenging to determine the identity of the audience. Tindale (p. 75 ff., cf. Tindale 2013, p.
512) point to this, when he says that not even individuals have a simple singular identity, because
we each individually are “diverse diversities” (Sen 2006, p. 13; Tindale 2015, p. 76). Because of
problems like these Tindale suggests, it seems to me, that studying audience identity is not very
fruitful for argumentation studies, because the issues of audience “identity present more
challenges for argumentation than they offer benefits” (2015, p. 28).
Tindale certainly has a good point, and informal logicians have emphasized the problems
with the “noninteractive” mass audience, whose views are unknown and unpredictable (Govier
1999; cf. Kjeldsen 2016 (forthcoming)). On the other hand, we might gain new insight into the
audience-identity if we turn the approach around. Instead of asking: who do we think the
audiences are; we may ask audiences themselves who they consider themselves to be. We may
empirically explore how audiences constitute themselves. This connects to the second issue
raised by Tindale: Persuasion.
Instead of searching for the exact identity of the audience, I suggest that we should be
more concerned with how an argument, or any rhetorical appeal, is constructed, and how it is
audience-oriented, which is what Professor Tindale’s book in some ways set out to do. We
should also be concerned with how arguments are actually received, interpreted, and processed –
that is: how actual audiences actually respond to rhetoric. As pointed out by rhetoric scholar
Edward Schiappa: “We need to find out what people are doing with representations rather than
being limited to making claims about what we think representations are doing to people”
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(Schiappa, 2008, p. 26). This, however, as I have suggested, should also be done empirically by
investigating empirical audiences.
Effect and persuasion is connected to the third issue: Evaluation. Tindale emphasizes that
when we consider what makes an argument good, or strong, or cogent we cannot leave out the
audience because a contextless god’s is a view from nowhere, and it “commands only as much
confidence as the theoretical apparatus that supports it” (p. 32). Evaluation deals with two things:
firstly, is there a difference between a persuasive argument – one that creates audience uptake –
and a rational and ethical argument? Is an effective argument a valid argument? Secondly, if
audience uptake is the criterion, then how much uptake should count?
For Tindale Perelman’s three audiences help us see how audiences experience
argumentation, and Habermas’ “ideal audience” takes us even further in this direction. As
mentioned, Tindale argues that this audience effectiveness is not enough for evaluation, because
Habermas’ ideal audience offers a view that lets us judge arguments
against community standards of rationality themselves instantiated in an audience
that necessarily has an aspect of the “ideal” about it, while remaining concrete in
the relevant social context. (p. 98)
What do audiences perceive as good arguments? How do they consider the differences between
effect and ethics? Also this aspect, evaluation, cold be examined empirically, by looking into the
norms the audiences actually apply when encountering argumentation. I suggest that they
constantly negotiate between norms of rationality and ethics and other norms such as
effectiveness, politeness, and interactional aspects of face-saving. Exactly how audiences do this,
however, must be explored empirically.
In the last pages of his book Tindale returns to the concept of cognitive environment and
the issues of audience identity, persuasion, and evaluation. The cognitive environment, he
explains,
contain ideas, attitudes, and information generally of which we may be
unconscious but to which attention can be drawn through argumentation. As a
tool, the cognitive environment allows us to shift attention away from (fruitless)
inquiry into what people allegedly know and focus instead on what they might
reasonably be expected to know. (p. 222)
The way I understand Tindale, this concept may help us move closer to “real communities”, in
order to conceptualize universal – or ideal – audiences. This may then enable us to understand
the persuasiveness of arguments, and provide “the impersonal evaluative standard to match the
personal validity by which we understand effectiveness” (p. 223). So, what then, is the lesson?
Tindale’s own words express it best:
the lesson is that audiences can elect to be spoken to, can learn things from what
others say that those others never intended. We are no less audiences of those
discourses for finding that there what was not intended, or for not having been
intended ourselves as audiences. It speaks to the multi-dimensionality of our
social experiences, which argumentation has the task, in part, to understand, to
explain, and to improve.
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